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THE BUSINESS OF ART THEFT:
ASSESSING AUCTION HOUSE
STANDARD OF CARE AND THE SALE
OF STOLEN CULTURAL PROPERTY
ALEXANDRA M. S. WILSON*
Art theft is the third largest criminal enterprise in the world. New York,
the center of the internationalart exchange and home to major auction
houses, has attempted to limit the profitability of the illicit art trade.
However, the nature of the art market makes this issue difficult to
alleviate, let alone solve. Auction houses' customary "no questions
asked" policy towards ownership, naive buyers unaware of market
practices, incomplete provenance records, and lack of a uniform due
diligence standard, are all factors that make this landscape hardly
navigable. This Comment addresses the special role auction houses
play in the commercial exchange of stolen art and what standardof
care houses should be held to.
Auction houses are in a special position of power. Established art
dealer liabilities and remedies inform the fact that auction houses are
better equippedthan good faithpurchasers to discover stolen works and
rectify the problem. In appropriatingan economic framework, which
has been used to establish art dealer liabilities when selling stolen
works, I recommend that auction houses should be held liable, and the
buyer should recover the benefit of his bargain plus interest when
auction houses are indifferent to a work's provenance.
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INTRODUCTION

After gun and drug trafficking, art theft is the largest criminal enterprise
in the world.' Further, the art and cultural property trade is the leading
unregulated business on the planet. 2 While the full extent of the illegal art
market is unknown, 3 across the world, 50,000-100,000 works are stolen
each year,4 and only five to ten percent of all stolen art is ever recovered.
Stolen art is often smuggled, traded internationally, and kept in private
collections away from the public eye, only becoming public when it is sold
through legitimate markets, including auction houses.6
New York, a major hub for international art exchange and home to
auction houses including Sotheby's and Christie's, 7 has enacted laws that
1. Kris Hollington, After Drugs and Guns, Art Theft is the Biggest Criminal
Enterprise in the World, NEWSWEEK
(July 22,
2014,
10:09 AM),
http://www.newsweek.com/2014/07/18/after-drugs-and-guns-art-theft-biggest-criminal
-enterprise-world-260386.html.
2. Id. But see JUDITH B. PROWDA, VISUAL ARTS AND THE LAW: A HANDBOOK FOR
PROFESSIONALS 183 (2013) ("Paradoxically, auctions-historically one of the oldest
institutions for buying and selling art-are perhaps the most stringently regulated
entities in the art trade, while at the same time one of the least regulated industries in

the US.").
3. Hollington, supra note 1.
4. Id. (adding that the FBI estimates that the criminal income generated from art
theft is $6-8 billion each year).
5.
Sydney M. Drum, Comment, DeWeerth v. Baldinger:Making New York a Safe
Haven for Stolen Art, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 909, 911 (1989); see also Hollington, supra

note I ("Successful prosecution [of art thieves] occurs even less frequently.").
6. See Drum, supra note 5, at 910-11.
7. Id. at 909 (recognizing that New York City is the Mecca of the art and
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attempt to resolve art-theft issues specifically. 8 However, auction houses,
art dealers, and collectors have played, and continue to play, an important
role in encouraging art theft,9 further increasing the tension between
treating art as a for-profit business opportunity and treating art as
personally and culturally invaluable historical patrimony.10 For example,
after World War II, auction houses and other art market players were
reluctant to probe provenance-or chain of title-either out of indifference
or out of real concern for how a famous work of art coincidentally made its
way to market."
The two major international auction houses, Sotheby's and Christie's,12
have combined art sales of $11-12 billion a year.' 3 Further, it is estimated
that private sales amounted to $30 billion in 2008.14 Although many works
are consigned and sold through auction houses, the supply of traditionally
stolen art (i.e. impressionist and modern art) is shrinking. 5 Moreover,
many of these works will never return to auction or to the art market in

antiquities market).
8.
Kelly Walton, Leave No Stone Unturned: The Search for Art Stolen by the
Nazis and the Legal Rules Governing Restitution of Stolen Art, 9 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 549, 590 (1999) (stating that New York courts have helped

the state from becoming a safe haven for stolen art by applying laches to stolen art
cases. Its courts hold "that if an owner cannot prove that she has thoroughly
investigated a work's history, she will be forced to hand it back, or pay the original
owners or their heirs the full market value.").
9. See Hollington, supra note 1 (stating that there is currently no legal obligation
to publicly list art sales); see also Julia McCord, Note, The Strategic Targeting of Due
Diligence: A New Perspective on Stemming the Illicit Trade in Art, 70 IND. L.J. 985,

1007 (1995) ("Without the opportunity to transfer art and antiquities through auction
houses, the illicit art trade will be less profitable for art thieves.").
10. See Anna Dempster, Trust, but verify, as they say, ART NEWSPAPER (July 11,
2013),
http://old.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Trust-but-verify-as-they-say/30096
("The art world is riddled with tensions: between the rational and the emotional,
commerce and culture, public and private, collectors and investors, amateurs and
connoisseurs-and between trust and transparency in the art market.").
11. Walton, supra note 8, at 551.
12.

See

SARAH THORNTON,

SEVEN

DAYS

IN

THE

ART

WORLD

5

(2008)

(maintaining that together, Sotheby's and Christie's account for "98 percent of the
global auction market for art").
13. Hollington, supra note 1; see also DON THOMPSON, THE $12 MILLION STUFFED
SHARK: THE

CURIOUS

ECONOMICS OF CONTEMPORARY ART

95 (2008) ("Christie's and

Sotheby's form a duopoly, the name an economist gives a competitive paring that
dominates a market: Coke and Pepsi, McDonald's and Burger King, or Boeing and
Airbus.").
14. Hollington, supra note 1.
15. THOMPSON, supra note 13, at 54; see also THORNTON, supra note 12, at 6
(quoting Christie's head auctioneer, "We are running out of earlier material, so our
market is being pushed closer to the present day . . .. The shortage of older goods is

thrusting newer work into the limelight [.]").
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general. 16 Perhaps, more importantly, most of these artworks will never
have the opportunity to be seen in public again.
This Comment will address the role auction houses play in the
commercial exchange of stolen art and what duty of care auction houses
owe purchasers in regard to researching provenance and discovering stolen
artworks in their possession. There are examples of stolen works that have
been sold through major auction houses, such as Sotheby's and Christie's,
and it is important to note that these auction houses have profited from
these sales. 17 However, it is not yet clear what standard of care auction
houses should be held to because there is no legal precedent; all cases have
resulted in settlements before any auction house liability could be assessed.
This Comment recommends that auction houses should be held liable, and
the buyer should be able to recover the benefit of his bargain when auction
houses are merely or blatantly indifferent to a work's provenance.
I. METHODOLOGY
Appropriating a law and economics framework that has been previously
used when assessing art dealer standards of care owed to unwitting buyers
of stolen artwork, it is necessary that an auction house has a legal
obligation to a buyer, and the buyer should be made whole when stolen
works make their way through auction. Using established art dealer
liabilities and their economic justifications, I propose that these standards
of care and their remedies should be extended to situations where auction
houses facilitate the sale of stolen art.
I will first provide a brief overview of the current and complex art
market landscape, which informs a need to apply an economic framework
to the issue. Although there is an important legal distinction between
auction houses and art dealers-a distinction that triggers a legal obligation
for dealers to sell a work with good title-there are noteworthy instances in
which auction houses have acted in bad faith and have been less than
diligent but have escaped liability. These instances, as well as buyers' and
art market participants' sophistication, provenance reliability, due diligence
issues, the international aspect of the trade, and established art dealer
liabilities, serve as evidence that the auction house standard of care when
facilitating the sale of stolen works of art is an unresolved issue.
Second, I will analyze and provide an understanding of the economic
justifications for current art dealer duty of care owed to purchasers.

54.
at 186-87 (recognizing that houses receive fees
from consigners including commission, and also collect fees from buyers including
buyer's premium).
16.
17.

THOMPSON, supra note 13, at
See PROWDA, supra note 2,
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Because, like art dealers, auction houses occupy a special seat of power in
the art market, there is an asymmetry of information between houses and
purchasers, there are due diligence issues, purchasers are unable to
efficiently evaluate and monitor their risk, and there are valid public policy
concerns. These are justifications used to establish that art dealer liability
is equally applicable to auction houses. Therefore, auction houses should
owe the same duty of care to buyers, as art dealers do, when they sell stolen
works of art.
II. THE CURRENT ART MARKET LANDSCAPE

Navigation in the present art market landscape is difficult for all
stakeholders, including art dealers, consignors, collectors, museums, and
purchasers. However, there are stakeholders, specifically auction houses,
that are in social and economic positions to not only combat the illicit art
trade but also help make the market more transparent and legitimate in
general. The reality of the art market landscape warrants a reassessment of
auction house liability when facilitating the sale of stolen works of art.
A. Art Dealers v. Auction Houses: A Legal Distinction
Although auction houses are in a position to help reduce the illicit art
trade, houses are not currently legally obligated to do so. Obligation is
triggered based on a business' relationship to the buyer and seller, which
determines whether the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C." or the
"Code") applies. This triggered obligation can be explained by describing
the traditional legal distinction between an art dealer and an auction house.
Traditionally, an art dealer directly purchases a work from the ownerbecoming the work's owner and titleholder-and then sells the work to a
third-party on his own behalf.18 Therefore, the dealer is legally accountable
to both the previous owner and the buyer.1 9 The dealer has a direct
financial stake in the work, the U.C.C. applies to his transactions, and he
must be able to pass good title onto a subsequent purchaser. 20 An auction
house, on the other hand, does not traditionally purchase the work itself
from the owner. Instead, a house acts as an intermediary between the
21
When a work is sold, an auction
consignor and the third-party buyer.

18. See Patty Gerstenblith, Picture Imperfect: Attempted Regulation of the Art
Market, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 501, 554 (1988).
19. See id. at 554-55.
20. U.C.C. § 2-312(1)(a) (1999) (stating that a seller is required to ensure that "the
title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful").
21. See PROWDA, supra note 2, at 184 ("The job of the auction house is twofold: to
attract consignments and to conduct the sale, both in a responsible manner"); see also
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house collects commission from the consignor as well as fees from the
buyer.22 The house, therefore, is not subject to the U.C.C. and, unlike an
art dealer, has no direct financial stake in the work.2 3
An auction house, as an agent of the consignor, has both an agency and
24
fiduciary relationship with the consignor. However, houses have no such
relationship to the purchaser, even though buyers pay a special house fee
("buyer's premium") when their bid is successful.2 5 Therefore, the buyer
has little legal protection and recourse against the house if something goes
wrong with the sale.26
This traditional distinction between art dealers and auction houses is
diminishing, for dealers and houses have expanded their services and
practices. 27 Most notably, houses can function as dealers and purchase
works to then sell on their own behalf. 28 Because auction houses buy the
work itself, they are not merely acting as agents of the seller. They have a
Glossary, INT'L FOUND. FOR ART RESEARCH, https://www.ifar.org/glossary.php (last
visited Mar. 20, 2015) (defining 'consignment' as "[t]he act of conveying goods to one
[including auction houses] who will sell them for the owner or transport them for the
owner").
22. See THOMPSON, supra note 13, at 102 ("The auction house performs a great
many other functions in return for its seller's commission and buyer's premium. After
obtaining the consignment, it stores and transports the art, researches authenticity and
provenance .... Each function is taken for granted by consignors who assume that
such prestigious firms will perform each competently.").
23. See Gerstenblith, supra note 18, at 555.
24. Id. at 553; see also PROWDA, supra note 2, at 184, 186 ("The auction house
must act in the utmost good faith and in the best interest of the principal, the consignor,
at all times. A breach of fiduciary duty could give rise to liability on the part of the
auction house as agent for the consignor as principal, whether the cause of action is
based in contract or negligence." Further, "[t]he auction house is also responsible for
the safekeeping of the [consigned] work for sale and the collection and distribution of
the auction proceeds . .. .).
25. See Valerie Medelyan, Says Who?: The Futility of Authenticating Art in the
Courtroom, 36 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 6-7 (2014); see also THOMPSON, supra
note 13, at 101 (finding that the term "buyer's premium" implies that an "auction house
has no duty to the buyer. The terminology mirrors the legal reality that the auction
house's fiduciary duty is only to the seller; otherwise there would be a conflict of
interest").
26. See Gerstenblith,supra note 18, at 554; see also PROWDA, supra note 2, at 187
(noting that purchasers have limited recourse against auction houses in the event that
the purchased work is inauthentic. "The buyer relies on the credibility and expertise of
the auction house and on the representations about the property that are contained in the
auction catalog. Therefore, if an auction house represents to the buyer that the work is
authentic, the buyer has a right to rely on that information. Later, if questions arise
concerning the authenticity of the work, the buyer will seek recourse from the auction
house . . . . Both Sotheby's and Christie's provide limited warranties guaranteeing for
five years from the date of sale ..... ).
27. Gerstenblith, supra note 18, at 555-56.
28. Id. at 556.
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direct financial interest in the work, and they are responsible to subsequent
purchasers if the title to the work is less than whole.
B. Auction House Standardof Care:An Unresolved Issue

Auction houses, including Christie's and Sotheby's, have been sued for
facilitating the sale of stolen works of art. However, auction houses have
thus far been able to escape court-established liability, either through direct
settlement with the buyer or by facilitating settlements between the seller
and the original owner. 2 9 Although some cases suggest that the auction
house in question-when selling stolen works of art-did act in good faith
and performed extensive due diligence investigations, there are many
instances when it appears that auction houses were either less than diligent
or even acted in blatant bad faith by turning a blind eye to numerous red
flags and suspicious provenance.
Abrams v. Sotheby Park-BernetInc. discussed, but did not resolve, the

issues of auction house liability and the responsibility to investigate
provenance of works offered for sale at auction.30 In 1984, Sotheby's
proffered a collection of Renaissance-era Hebrew books and manuscripts,
originally belonging to a library in East Berlin, for sale. 3 1 Although the
house was ultimately satisfied that the consignor was the true owner,
Sotheby's misrepresented aspects of the works' chain of title.3 2 Sotheby's
thus failed to adequately disclose the works' questionable provenance to
prospective buyers.3 3 The court granted a temporary restraining order,
preventing the distribution of the auctioned works, and it found that
Sotheby's internal due diligence procedures may have been inadequate.34
29. See generally Hanoch Sheps, Lessons on Auction Houses from Sotheby's and
the Case of the Stolen Renoir, CENTER FOR ART LAW (Oct. 28, 2013),
http://itsartlaw.com/2013/10/28/lessons-on-auction-houses-from-sothebys-and-the-

case-of-the-stolen-renoir/ (explaining that there is sparse legal precedent guiding
auction house liability when there is a sale of stolen art. Further, "any liability incurred
by the auction house-if it denies the request to return the piece-remains unclear.");
see also Gerstenblith, supra note 18, at 528-29 ("Customary practice, according to the
president of Christie's, is to refund the entire purchase price to the buyer [rescind the
sale] and return the object to the rightful owner.").
30. Gerstenblith, supra note 18, at 526-27.
31. Id. at 526; see also McCord, supra note 9, at 1007 (describing the house's
provenance investigation process. The house inquired with the FBI, studied stolen
property lists and bills of sale, and assessed general public knowledge about the history
of the objects. Sotheby's also consulted with a German law firm to research German
and postwar restitution law).
32. Gerstenblith, supra note 18, at 526 (stating that the house made
misrepresentations about which collections the works originated from in its catalogue
prepared for the sale).
33. Id. at 526-527.
34. McCord, supra note 9, at 1007.
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However, this suit never went to trial and was instead settled without any
finding of fault or liability.35
Another example includes the Schloss family heirs. 3 6 The family has
had numerous suits against the major auction houses for facilitating the sale
of stolen art, including one suit regarding a Hals painting. The painting
was stolen by the Nazis from the family in Paris, and on several occasions,
it made its way through auction.3 7 Christie's listed the painting for sale in a
1972 auction but failed to mention that it was stolen in its historical
description.3 8 Sotheby's listed the painting for sale in 1979 and noted in its
description that the painting had been stolen. 39 Although Sotheby's
performed a provenance investigation and uncovered the painting's tainted
history, the house neither stopped the sale nor attempted to contact the
work's true owners.4 0
The Hals painting was then offered for sale again at Christie's in 1989
without mention of its status as a stolen work of art. 4 1 The police seized the
painting after a New York gallery owner bought and offered the painting
for sale in 1990.42 Christie's reimbursed the gallery owner, but Christie's
and the Schloss heirs have been in various legal disputes ever since.43
Bad faith continues to be an issue, even though auction houses have
-44
internal policies regarding due diligence and provenance investigation.

35. Gerstenblith, supra note 18, at 527.
36.
Stephanie Cuba, Note, Stop the Clock: The Case to Suspend the Statute of
Limitations on Claims for Nazi-Looted Art, 17 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 447, 467
(1999) ("The Schloss collection was one of the most expansive collections in Paris

before it was looted by the Nazis.").
37. Walton, supra note 8, at 569.
38.
39.

Id.
Id. (showing that the description noted that the painting was listed in the

official "Catalog of French Property Stolen between 1939-1945").
40.

Id.

41.

Id. (suggesting that Sotheby's catalogue was either not read or it was ignored);

see also Souren Melikian, Buyer Beware: An Art World Nightmare Worthy of Kafka:
The Mystery of a Looted Portrait, N.Y. TIMES (2001), http://www.nytimes.com
/2001/09/01/news/Oliht-melik ed3 .html (adding that when Christie's failed to find a
buyer, a salesroom notice was even posted to dispel the rumor that the painting had
been stolen).
42. Walton, supra note 8, at 569.
43. Id.
44. Gerstenblith, supra note 18, at 527-28 (discussing Sotheby's routine
procedure, which includes checks with the FBI and studies of stolen property lists and
bills of sale). But see Deborah DePorter Hoover, Note, Title Disputes in the Art
Market: An Emerging Duty of Carefor Art Merchants, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 443,

457 n.108 (1983) ("Ordinarily, auction houses do not make extensive inquires into the
consignor's possession of title. Rather, they tend to rely on the openness of their sale
techniques and the fact that their catalogues are published.").
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For example, Sotheby's has been caught many times auctioning looted
antiquities.45 In 1997, journalist Peter Watson uncovered that, on at least
two occasions, sculptures from Angor Wat, Cambodia had been smuggled
directly into Sotheby's London offices.46
Strikingly, between 1988 and 2010, Sotheby's offered 377 Khmer
antiquities f6r auction, 4 7 and seventy-one percent of the 377 antiquities had
no listed provenance. 4 8 Although auction houses are not required to
disclose provenance information,49 the information that was offered was
suspect and created an illusion of legitimacy.50 Since the works' suspect
provenances suggest an illegal origin for much of the Khmer objects
offered for auction, many organizations, scholars, and foreign governments
have requested that Sotheby's provide information about these works' true
origins, but the house has thus far refused.
1. Buyer Sophisticationand other Art Market Participants
The art market has evolved from one comprising experienced dealers
and professional agents, acting on behalf of museums and collectors, to one
52
with many novice and nafve participants bidding on their own behalf.
This developing class of auction bidders is rather ignorant about the objects
on which it is bidding and unaware of the need to consult third-party
evaluations of works offered at auction." As a result, buyers, who are all
too trusting, are susceptible to deception and manipulation in the auction

45. Tess Davis, Supply and Demand: Exposing the Illicit Trade in Cambodian
Antiquities Through a Study of Sotheby's Auction House, CRIME LAW & Soc. CHANGE
155, 159 (2011).
46. Id. at 160.
47. Id. at 162.
48. Id. at 163.
Walton, supra note 8, at 567.
49.
50. Davis, supra note 45, at 166 (commenting that seventy-seven percent of the
antiquities that had listed provenances were sourced to private collections. Twenty-five
of the objects had been previously placed for auction. Of those twenty-five objects,
twenty of them were previously offered for sale at Sotheby's. Moreover, none of the
337 works included provenance from an official scientific excavation even though the
majority of them came from archeological sites. More notably, none of the works
demonstrated that they were sold by or with permission of Cambodia even though
Cambodia's law dictates that the country owns its archeological, cultural, and historical
property. Furthermore, export permits for all Cambodian art and antiquities have been
required since 1925, and there is no evidence that these works were removed from the
country before that time).
51. Id. at 171 (arguing that this refusal is "hardly a testament to [Sotheby's]
innocence.").
52. William Stuart, Authenticity of Authorship and the Auction Market, 54 ME. L.
REV. 71, 72 (2002).
53. Id. at 72-73.
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Although novice buyers may fail to act in their best interest,
sophisticated art market participants also have a history of acting
irrationally and getting swept up in the auction process. This irrational
behavior may be in part because there is a shrinking supply of traditional
art as a result of widespread expansion of both museums and private
collections.
2. ProvenanceReliability
The only chain of title that exists in art is the concept of provenance, or
ownership history. Although provenance can serve as proof of ownership
if an artwork's legal title is contested, provenance records are notorious for
being forged and inaccurate.
Moreover, complete records of ownership
are rarely found, especially for works produced before the 20th century.
Therefore, researching and tracing a work's provenance does not

54. Id. at 72 (maintaining that buyers are specifically susceptible to
misrepresentations of goods as well as general "manipulative practices devised to raise
the ultimate price paid for those goods"); see also THOMPSON, supra note 13, at 117-18

("Inexperienced buyers find the auction process itself to be reassuring: the catalogue

entries written with great authority, references to auction house 'specialists,' and the
fact that other sophisticated people are lusting after the same works." Further, many
potential bidders "rely on auction specialists, who come to be perceived as art
consultants rather than salespeople ..... ).
55. THOMPSON, supra note 13, at 54 ("The past twenty-five years have seen a
hundred new museums around the world, each intent on acquiring, on average, two
thousand works of art." Further, as sophisticated art market participants, including
museums and private collectors, become aware of the fact that the traditional art supply
is shrinking, these participants accordingly approach art deals as "last chance"
situations. These players often purchase works without importantly considering past
prices-even in periods where there are no shortages of work, i.e. contemporary art).
56. Hollington, supra note 1.
57. Provenance
Guide,
INT'L
FOUND.
FOR
ART
RESEARCH,
http://www.ifar.org/provenanceguide.php(last visited Mar. 19, 2015) (stating that art

forgers "often falsify information establishing the provenance of a work of art-forging
receipts of sale, ownership marks, dealers' records, exhibition labels, and collectors'
stamps. For this reason, provenance history is seldom accepted as the sole proof of
authenticity for a work of art."); see also Patty Gerstenblith, Cultural, Aesthetic and
Legal Perspectives on Authenticity, 35 COLUM. L.J. & ARTS 321, 322-23, 338 (20112012) (discussing that there are forgery schemes involving the manufacture of fake
provenance information and face authenticity certificates to convince the art world of a
work's legitimacy).
58.

See Provenance Guide, supra note 57 ("An ideal provenance history would

include the following information: a documentary record of owners' names; dates of
ownership, and means of transference, i.e., inheritance, or sale through a dealer or
auction; and locations where the work was kept, from the time of its creation by the
artist until the present day.").
59.

Id.
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necessarily diminish the risk that the work was once stolen.60 Furthermore,
auction houses are not required to disclose provenance information to a
prospective purchaser, which hinders the individual's ability to perform a
61
provenance investigation before the sale occurs.
3. Due Diligence Considerations
Most art is housed in private collections, unlikely to be found by
happenstance, and can effectively be found only through investigation.62
However, there is an issue regarding who needs to perform, and what will
satisfy, a due diligence investigation in any court because there is no set
standard for any art market stakeholder. 6 3 Further, is not necessarily clear
to an original owner whether he will be able to legally recover his
patrimony. Specifically, there is inconsistency among the courts for when
the prescribed limitation period begins to run against an original owner to
make a claim for an object's return.64 This complicates a buyer's ability to
understand whether he is buying an artwork with clear title-because the
statute has tolled-or if he is buying an artwork that can be claimed by the
original owner at any unknown and hypothetical point in the future.65

60. Marylin Phelan, Scope of Due Diligence Investigation in Obtaining Title to
Valuable Artwork, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 631, 688-89 (2000); see also Constance
Lowenthal & Stephen E. Weil, A Dialogue on Provenance and Due Diligence, 3 IFAR

J. 10, 14 (2000) (explaining that provenance information is generally easier to find once
one is in the middle of a lawsuit, when there is a cause of action and the information is
importantly needed).
61. Davis, supra note 45, at 165 (outlining three situations in which a house may
decide to conceal a work's provenance. First, the provenance is legitimate, but the
consignor does not want the information to be published; second, the provenance is
known but is incriminating, i.e., stolen; or, third, the provenance is unknown).
62. Drum, supra note 5, at 931.
63. See Walton, supra note 8, at 599-601 (suggesting that when a work is acquired
from suspicious circumstances, the following actions should be encouraged: reporting
the theft to the police, FBI, Interpol, UNESCO, IFAR; consulting international auction
houses; and contacting individuals from museums and galleries).
64.

Herbert Hirsch, Provenance and Legal Responsibility: What Constitutes Due

Diligence?, 3 IFAR J. 53, 53 (2000) (discussing that most states follow the 'discovery
rule,' whereby "the limitation period starts when the theft victim discovers, or most
likely would have discovered through a diligent search, the possessor of her stolen
property..

. . "

New York, the center of the international art exchange, is an outlier

)

because its courts follow the 'demand-and-refusal rule.' "[T]he three-year limitation
period to recover stolen property begins to run only after the theft victim demands that
the good faith purchaser return her property and the purchaser refuses .
)....
65. See id at 57 ("New York is a desirable state for an art theft victim to bring a
recovery action because, effectively, there is no Statute of Limitations. The burden is
on the good faith purchaser to show prejudice resulting from the delay in filing the
lawsuit.").
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4. The InternationalAspect of the Market
The art market is an international market, and each country has different
standards that determine whether good title to the work has passed or not,
even if the work was originally stolen.66 Because artworks cross national
boundaries, prospective art purchasers would need to know that they cannot
assume that the work has clear title simply because there is an established
chain of owners. In all, one author accurately asserts, "[e]ven the most
diligent art consumer cannot typically access enough reliable information
to determine with confidence whether a proposed art deal is a wise
investment." 67

5. Art DealerLiability When Selling Stolen Works ofArt
Although courts have not yet established a standard of care for auction
houses facilitating the sale of stolen works, New York courts have placed
an affirmative duty to investigate an artwork's title on art dealers,68 as
exemplified in the cases Menzel v. List and Porter v. Wertz. Together,
these cases propose that an art dealer is strictly liable to a subsequent good
faith purchaser, and the buyer is entitled to recover the benefit of his
bargain if the dealer is merely indifferent to a work's provenance and the
work was stolen.
In the leading 1969 case, Menzel v. List, Erna Menzel and her husband,
the original owners of a Chagall painting, left their painting behind after
fleeing Brussels during the Nazi invasion in 1941 .69 The painting made its
way to a gallery in Paris and was subsequently purchased by Klaus Perls,
an art dealer in New York, without inquiring into the painting's
provenance. 70 Perls later sold the painting to a well-known art collector
and good faith purchaser, Albert List, and the Menzels, after years of
diligently searching and eventually learning of the painting's location,

66. Arabella Yip, Stolen Art: Who Owns it Often Depends on Whose Law Applies,
1 SPENCER'S ART L.J. (July 2010), http://www.artnet.com/magazineus/news/spencer/
spencers-art-law-journal7-26-10.asp#yip (noting that in the United States, a thief
cannot, under any circumstances, pass good title. Therefore, a good faith purchaser can
rarely acquire superior title to the original owner. However, under Swiss law, a good
faith purchaser can more easily acquire superior title to a stolen work of art. This
suggests that just because an artwork can be freely bought and sold in Switzerland does
not mean that it can be legitimately bought and sold in the United States).

67.

Gregory Day, Explaining the Art Market's Thefts, Frauds, and Forgeries (and

Why the Art Market Does not Seem to Care), 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 457, 461
(2014).
68. See Hoover, supra note 44, at 444.
69. Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 806 (App. Div. 1966).
70.
Id. at 808.
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demanded the painting's return.n Perls relied on industry custom and
assumed, without performing his own investigations, that by buying a work
from a reputable gallery, the gallery effectively represented that the work
had clear title. 72
The New York Court of Appeals criticized art dealer custom of not
inquiring into the source of its artwork and held the art dealer liable for
breach of implied warranty of title.73 List was ordered to return the
painting to the Menzels, but he was not without remedy.74 The good faith
buyer became whole by recovering the then-present value of the painting,
which was valued at the date of the trial. The court provided an important
caveat and noted that had the gallery articulated the fact that the work had
questionable title, the gallery would not have been held liable in this case.
In sum, the highest New York court established art dealer liability when
selling stolen works of art, and it encouraged those in the art market to
perform title searches.
The New York Court of Appeals again encouraged art merchants to
perform title searches in the 1981 case Porter v. Wertz.78 In Porter, the
court held that an art dealer's indifference to a work's provenance is
inconsistent with both exercising good faith and observing reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing under the U.C.C. 7 9 By exhibiting
indifference to the work's provenance, a dealer is subsequently liable to a
good faith purchaser. Further, an art dealer can only become a good faith
purchaser if he, prior to buying the work, has investigated the work's title.so
Samuel Porter, the original owner of a Utrillo painting, loaned his
painting to a man using the alias of Peter Wertz. Wertz, in turn, sold the
painting to the Feigen gallery, and the gallery sold the work to a buyer in

71.
72.

Id. at 806-07.
Id. at 808.

73. Menzel v. List, 246 N.E.2d 742, 745 (N.Y. 1969).
74. Hoover, supra note 44, at 452 n.68.
75.. Menzel, 246 N.E.2d at 745; see also Walton, supra note 8, at 586 (suggesting
that the court-ordered remedy is the same amount List would have been able to sell the
painting for had Perls conveyed good title to the work).
76. Menzel, 246 N.E.2d at 745 ("Had the Perls taken the trouble to inquire as to
title, they could have sold to List subject to any existing lawful claims unknown to
them at the time of the sale.").
77. See Walton, supra note 8, at 586-87.
78. Hoover, supra note 44, at 449 (recognizing that Porter is the "most extensive
judicial statement on an art dealer's duty to investigate title").
79. Id. at 447.
80. See id. at 444-45.
81. Porter v. Wertz, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254, 255 (App. Div. 1979).
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Venezuela.82 Feigen gallery did not inquire whether Wertz could pass good
title, even though the gallery had reason to believe that the seller was using
a false identify, and the real Peter Wertz was in fact a delicatessen
employee.83 The court did not resolve the issue of whether the gallery
failed to act in good faith when it did not inquire into the ownership of the
Utrillo painting. 84 However, had the court found a lack of good faith, the
buyer, under the U.C.C., would be entitled to recover the benefit of his
bargain.85
III. AUCTION HOUSE POWER: A PRACTICAL AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

Because auction houses do not convey a work of art's title onto a
subsequent purchaser and are treated merely as transactional facilitators,
houses are not currently subject to the same court-established standards of
care as art dealers when they sell stolen works. However, an economic
analysis of art dealer cases, including Menzel and Porter, as well as an
economic understanding of the art market's landscape, indicates a need to
apply established art dealer standards of care and remedies equally to
auction houses.86

Considerations include that auction houses, like art dealers, hold a
special seat of power in the art market-a seat that allows them to better
absorb costs in the event clear title is not passed onto a subsequent good
faith purchaser. Additionally, there is an asymmetry of information that
benefits houses by perpetuating secrecy, which is a further major
disadvantage to buyers. Moreover, realistic due diligence considerations
suggest that original owners and buyers have valid concerns for not
performing legally required investigations-investigations that auction
houses are capable of performing. Further, buyers are currently unable to
accurately and effectively monitor their risk, resulting in art market
inefficiencies and disruption. Lastly, in conjunction with establishing and
furthering effective public policy, establishing a new standard of care in a
largely unregulated business can help to combat-and lessen the

82. Id. at 256.
83.
Porter v. Wertz, 421 N.E.2d. 500, 501 (N.Y. 1981).
84. Id. at 502.
85. See Hoover, supra note 44, at 452 n.68 (stating that under the U.C.C., the
buyer is remedied with "the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the
value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been
warranted ......
Furthermore, if Menzel had been "decided under the U.C.C. the
[remedy] would probably be the same").
86. See generallyDempster, supra note 10 (explaining that the art market deals are
made based on trust. Although trust-based relationships can be beneficial-"[t]hey can
reduce the costs of transacting and encourage exchange"-trust-based relationships
have a dark side too).
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profitability of-the illicit art and cultural property trade.
A. UnderstandingArt DealerLiability: A Menzel and PorterAnalysis
In Menzel, the court, for the first time, determined that art dealers should
be subject to a standard of care when selling stolen works of art in part
because of economic reasoning and justifications. An art dealer-an
established merchant in a specialized field-is generally in a better position
to assume the risk of inadequate title than a non-merchant purchaser.
The
court proposed an economic efficiency argument when it suggested that art
dealers, compared with good faith purchasers, are least-cost avoiders.
More specifically, dealers are in a better position to spread the costs
associated with the mistake in title among all other purchasers (thereby
recouping its costs), rather than heavily burdening a single, good faith
buyer.
Moreover, when assessing and establishing an appropriate remedy, the
court.further employed and relied on economic reasoning and justifications.
List was awarded compensatory damages, allowing him to recover the
benefit of his bargain. 90 Specifically, the New York Court of Appeals
suggested that awarding List only the purchase price of the painting plus
interest is insufficient when it stated, "an injured buyer is not compensated
when he recovers only so much as placed him in status quo ante. . . . "91
This remedy would not only place List in the same position he would have
occupied had the sale never been made, but "such a recovery implicitly
denies that he had suffered any damage." 9 2 The court acknowledged that,
when determining a remedy, the amount must adequately reflect the fact
that the buyer has suffered as a result of the merchant's bad business
practice.93 As a result, it is suggested that the remedy act not only to make
the buyer whole but also to act as a deterrent for bad market practices. 94
Courts, including the Menzel court, seek to curb bad market practices such

87.
88.

See Gerstenblith, supra note 18, at 562.
See id.

89.

See id.

90.

See Menzel v. List, 246 N.E.2d. 742, 745 (N.Y. 1969).

91.

Id.

92. Id.; see also McCord, supra note 9, at 1006 n.126 (suggesting that although
present custom guiding the major international auction houses when settling a stolen art
suit is to refund the purchase price to the buyer when an original owner successfully
reclaims the stolen work, this remedy is neither a sufficient deterrent nor an ideal
remedy for the good faith purchaser. With the constant increase in value of artworks
and cultural property, this remedy may be far smaller than the fair market value at the
time the work is returned.).
93. See Menzel, 246 N.E.2d. at 745.
94.

See id.
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as instances when art dealers fail to thoroughly research a work's
provenance. 9 5
Significantly, the Menzel court acknowledged the art dealer's special
role in the art market, the dealer's seat of power, and the buyer's general
lack of market influence when establishing and justifying List's remedy.96
Simply, an art dealer is in a position to know whether his goods are
legitimate or not, and a buyer is in a position to trust the dealer's
judgment. 97 Although the art dealer in this case argued that the court's
measure of damages would expose an "innocent seller to potentially
ruinous liability" in instances where the object sold substantially
appreciates in value, the court stated that this "potential ruin" is well within
the seller's control.9 8 This is because the dealer is in a special position,
unlike a prospective purchaser, to take the necessary steps to research an
artwork's provenance and ensure that the artwork has whole and
transferable title.99
Furthermore, the court explained that, regardless of art market custom of
not fully investigating a work's title, "it is not requiring too much to expect
that, as a reasonable businessman, the dealer would himself either refuse to
buy, or, having bought, inform his vendee of the uncertain status of
title."100 The court was willing to establish an art dealer standard of care,
an area that had not been largely regulated before, in an attempt to create
good business and economical practices in a market that heavily favors
merchants at the expense of buyers.
The Porter court reinforced and expanded the Menzel court's economic
reasoning and justifications for establishing a new duty of care. Further,
the court moved beyond this economic framework and proposed an
important public policy argument. In Porter, the court relied on the
U.C.C., the Code's specific economic justifications as well as other
economic considerations, when establishing and developing art dealer
standard of care when dealing with stolen works of art. When discussing
the U.C.C., the court noted that the Code facilitates and eases commercial
transactions by "alleviating purchasers' 'need to inquire into sellers' ability
to transfer title."' 0' The Code accomplishes this in part because society
recognizes and accepts that a purchaser has a reasonable expectation that he

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Hoover, supra note 44, at 445.
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acquires good title from established merchants. 10 2 Moreover, the U.C.C.
importantly shifts the risk from good faith purchasers to owners-in this
case, art dealers-who are theoretically in a position to prevent
wrongdoing.103
Additionally, the court noted that the Code requires that a merchant act
in good faith in performing and enforcing every commercial contractl 04 and
that good faith entails observance of "reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing in the trade."os Although it is customary for art market
participants to assume that a work had good title, the court explained that
this was not a reasonable standard of fair dealing, given the good faith
purchaser's vulnerable position within the art market.10 6
The Supreme Court of New York specifically alluded to the public's
interest in reducing the illicit art market, and it discussed the reputational
harm to art market stakeholders if liability were not established.o7
Specifically, the court stated that Feigen's failure to research the work's
provenance, and its "failure to look into Wertz' authority to sell the
painting," is inexcusable.' 0 8 Even though Feigen was acting consistent
with the practice of the art trade and assumed that the work had whole title
regardless of numerous red flags suggesting otherwise (similar to the art
dealer in Menzel), the court explained that this practice both "facilitates
traffic in stolen works of art," which conflicts with public policy and
diminishes the merchant's integrity.109
On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, the court continued to
expand its economic justifications and presented public policy arguments
for establishing a new standard of care.1 10 For example, the Attorney
General argued, and the court agreed, that the dealer, rather than the
purchaser, is in a better and more efficient position to determine whether
further provenance investigation is necessary."'
Further, the court

102. See id.
103. See id.
104. Porter v. Wertz, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254, 257 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979); see also
Hoover, supra note 44, at 444.
105. Porter,416 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 259.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Hoover, supra note 44, at 447.
111. Id. at 447-48 n.39 (adding that the Art Dealers Association of America
("ADAA"), on the other hand, argued that it is not customary for art dealers, or art
merchants in general, to investigate works' title, and that the art business would be
crippled if this duty were imposed. In its amicus brief, the ADAA asserted that the lack
of amount of published and accessible information about the provenance of many
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suggested that art dealers hold a special seat of power in the art trade, and it
specifically reasoned that "[b]y holding himself out to the public as having
special expertise in art and art sales, a dealer invites liability if he fails to
exercise that expertise."ll 2 The court recognized that because purchasers
are significantly disadvantaged members of the art market, they
appropriately rely on and trust art dealers-as well as other art market
stakeholders-to make good decisions on their behalf.
In all, case law concerning art dealers when they sell stolen property
reveals that courts are appropriating economic frameworks to establish new
art market standards of care. From analyzing Menzel and Porter, it appears
that courts focus on the art dealer's special role and power within the art
market. Additionally, courts are also concerned with creating good public
policy. This is especially apparent when considering that courts are willing
to create new and potentially great liabilities for art dealers specifically
because courts are concerned about the creation of safe haven jurisdictions
for illicit art.
The law, in special instances, can and does serve the purpose of both
promoting public interest and cultural and historical values, even where
these values may diverge from market purposes." 3 Even though the art
market may suffer as a result of this new obligation and may not be as
profitable as it once was, courts have recognized that society's value in
cultural property outweighs, to a certain extent, the financial harm to the
market"14
B. Auction House Seat ofPower
Art dealer case law, including Menzel and Porter, recognizes that art
dealers are in a better position than prospective purchasers to navigate the
art market in general. Furthermore, art dealers are in a better position to
discern which works have been stolen and which works are legitimate.
These notions are equally applicable to auction houses. Not only have
auction houses assumed a preeminent role in today's art market, but also
houses have so much power as a business that the "auction [house] both
mirrors and influences the actual market."15
Additionally, auction houses have the specialized knowledge,
experience, contacts, paid personnel (including art experts), and other

works of art make title verification effectively impractical. However, the court found
the ADAA's arguments unpersuasive.).
112. Id.at449.
113. See Gerstenblith,supra note 57, at 351.
114. See id.
115. McCord, supra note 9, at 987, 1002.
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resources that individuals-even experienced buyers-do not have." 6
More specifically, auction houses are in a position to both investigate
materials consigned for sale and receive information from cultural
institutions, collectors, governments, and other art market participants
about works that have been stolen.' 17 Further,. like art dealers, and as
articulated in Menzel, auction houses are able to recoup a loss by spreading
the cost across many transactions." 8 Moreover, auction houses can more
thoroughly investigate provenance through insurance.1 19
Importantly, auction houses, as well as art dealers, are also in a position
to develop new standards and policies to avoid art theft issues and help
combat the illicit art trade. For example, as stakeholders that present
themselves to prospective buyers and consigners as experts in the art
market,1 2 0 auction houses and dealers arguably know which methods and
types of investigations are most effective in uncovering and discovering
stolen works of art. Therefore, they are in a position to know what kind of
due diligence standard should be legally required since there is currently no
uniform legal standard. Moreover, auction houses are in a position to know
and decide whether the art market should reevaluate its present dependence
on provenance as a valid and effective method of tracing a work's chain of
title.
C. Asymmetry of Information
Auction houses, like art dealers, are also in a better position than
prospective purchasers to navigate the art market because there is a current
and perpetuated asymmetry of information.1 21 This asymmetry of
116. Drum, supra note 5, at 943.
117. Phelan, supra note 60, at 721; see also Stephen A. Bibas, The Case Against
Statutes of Limitationsfor Stolen Art, 103 YALE L.J. 2437, 2463 (1994) ("One might
argue that checking title in all circumstances would be unduly burdensome and costly.
However, there is little reason to believe that this is true, given that The Art Loss
Register automatically checks every item offered for sale at major galleries and auction
houses.").
118. Gerstenblith, supra note 57, at 353.
119. Walton, supra note 8, at 608; see also Day, supra note 67, at 493 (commenting
that acquiring title insurance is slowly gaining general acceptance in the art market.
Insurance is beneficial within the stolen art context because underwriting decisions are
Therefore, insurance encourages art market
based on provenance research.
participants, including auction houses, to perform due diligence investigations. In
addition, insurance agencies "could share information about the works that they have
determined to be forgeries or stolen." In theory, this system should help market
stakeholders determine more easily which works are problematic and which works
have good title.).
120. See THOMPSON, supra note 13, at 107 ("Auction houses also compete for
consignors by emphasizing the role of their specialists.").
121. See Dempster, supra note 10; see also Day, supra note 67, at 460 ("[A]rt
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information is necessarily a disadvantage to the vulnerable good faith
buyer.122 For example, auction houses naturally know more about both the
work and the consignor than the buyer does.1 2 3 To a prospective purchaser,
the art market is largely opaque and littered with unverifiable information,
specifically in terms of price and provenance.1 2 4 Regarding price and
quality, in other market contexts, consumers and prospective purchasers are
able to gain the necessary knowledge to effectively evaluate goods and
determine a "'good 'price" for a good such as a TV or car.' 2 5 However,
when evaluating a work of art's price, prospective purchasers are not in a
position to effectively appraise the work and are therefore at the mercy of
the auction house or dealer.' 2 6
The current nature of the art market perpetuates secrecy,127 is a

dealers and sellers often withhold most product and sales data in order to drive up
prices artificially." This becomes extremely "troublesome when taking into account
the legal pitfalls facing an uninformed buyer.").
122. See Day, supra note 67, at 463 ("'[M]arket failure' refers to a process by
which information asymmetries cause buyers and sellers to misallocate resources,
resulting in systematic inefficiencies. Consumers who continuously spend too much on
a good, for instance, will have fewer resources to purchase other products and services,
harming both themselves and alternative vendors.").
123. Dempster, supra note 10.
124. Id.; see also THOMPSON, supra note 13, at 107-108 ("The potential bidder's
next step after seeing the catalogue is likely a meeting with the auction house specialist,
who tries to play up the historical and cultural importance of a work, the distinction of
its provenance, its iconic nature, how well this artist (or period) is doing in the resale
market, other famous collectors known to own the artist's work, or the investment
potential"); Day, supra note 67, at 467 ("A work's estimated value really is a black
box, wherein the process used by experts to appraise a painting's value is largely
unavailable to the common consumer.").
125. Day, supra note 67, at 467 (listing three factors that have no inherent value,
but could help a prospective purchaser evaluate an artwork's worth, including the
work's aesthetic value, its authorship, and its significance. However, unlike in other
market contexts, buyers cannot determine a fair market price by simply adding up the
value of a painting's component parts. Additionally, since "most works of art are
unique, singular commodities, buyers cannot rely upon the aggregation of a thousand
sales to inform the transaction." In all, the art business is unique because art purchasers
have little reference guide as to what is a reasonable price to pay).
126. Id. (arguing that because buyers are not in a position to evaluate an artwork's
price, purchasers "must depend upon an expert's subjective determination of a work's
beauty, influenced by the reputation of the artist who created it, to determine its value."
It is important to note that these experts work for auction houses); see also McCord,
supra note 9, at 1003 (stating that new buyers, who see art as merely a speculative
commodity, to their disadvantage, put their trust in auction houses to determine a
work's fair market value).
127. See Day, supra note 67, at 469 ("[T]he art market has fostered a cultural of
secrecy, conducting deals under the strictest confidentiality. These norms make it
taboo for buyers to ask sellers questions about a work's purchase history, prior owners,
and place of origin.").
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roadblock for stakeholders to make informed decisions, and encourages
participants to act irrationally. 12 8 There is no other business in the world in
which its customers would spend large amounts of money, gambling on the
fact that what they have bought has good title. In sum, basic legal
regulation-as well as efficient economic and business principles-is
generally lacking in the art market.1 29
D. Due Diligence
Regarding due diligence, and what is legally required of buyers and
consignors to perform adequate investigations, current legal requirements
often conflict with these art market participants' valid desire to remain
secret. 130 For example, art theft victims often decide not to contact the
police or pursue recovery actions out of an understandable concern that
"publicizing the crime will signal to other criminals that they possess
vulnerable art."l 3 1
Even sophisticated institutional purchasers, including museums, may be
deterred from reporting theft and may even "prefer to operate quietly
without insuring valuable paintings from theft." 3 2 In addition, owners do
not typically raise or fight a claim if they discover that a work is fake or
stolen out of personal embarrassment.133 Based on the current legal system
and the nature of the art market, buyers are often discouraged from
challenging merchants and inefficient, harmful art market practices.1 34 This
is problematic because, as one author notes, "[i]n the [U.S.], most of the
recent changes that have occurred in auction house practice are the result of

128. Id. at 464 (noting that the "foundation of an efficient market lies in its ability
to provide reliable information at a reasonable cost to that buyers and sellers can
dedicate resources to their wisest, most efficient uses."
Additionally, "[m]ost
developed legal systems . . . encourage efficiency by either requiring those with reliable
information to disseminate it or forbidding them from concealing it." Moreover,
"[e]fficient legal systems ... encourage the proper distribution of resources, usually by
increasing the volume and quality of market information.").
129. See id. at 462 ("[M]arket failure persists in the art world even though
sophisticated parties appear to have both the motivation and ability to demand
efficiency.").
130. Id. at 470.
131. Id. (recognizing that reporting instances of art theft can have the effect of
driving the work further underground, thus making it more difficult to retrieve the
stolen work); see also Bibas, supra note 117, at 2459 ("[P]ublicizing a theft makes a
stolen artwork dangerous to try to sell. This danger keeps the art in the thief s hands
for a long time until the 'hot' art cools down, thus delaying the owner's recovery.").
132. Day, supra note 67, at 470.
133. Id. at 486; see also Bibas, supra note 117, at 2455 (arguing that not publicizing
instances of art theft "has the ex ante effect of encouraging future thefts.").
134. See Day, supra note 67, at 486-87.
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a scandal or lawsuit. . . " against Christie's and/or Sotheby's. 135
It is important to note that, although victims of art theft and good faith
purchasers occasionally pursue legal action, as previously mentioned, there
is no unified due diligence standard. Because due diligence is decided on a
case-by-case basis, owners and purchasers (without established legal teams
and institutional resources) have only a limited and clouded idea of what is
expected of them in performing such an investigation.136
E. Monitoring Risk

Buyers have been willing, so far, to work with this landscape, but
why? 1 37 One author sheds light on the answer and notes, "the nature of the
art market resembles few other industries," specifically because there is a
probability and belief that the artwork will appreciate, rather than
depreciate, in value.138 Purchasers often treat art as an investment, and
accordingly, they see themselves not as current prospective buyers but
rather as future sellers. 139 Although the purchaser may not receive
adequate protection now, he reasons that he will receive the benefits and
protections afforded a seller in the future. 140 Believing that they will oneday benefit from being a seller, prospective purchasers are unable to
appropriately monitor their current risk. 14 1 In sum, the nature of the art
market makes it difficult for prospective purchasers to make good decisions
and act in their best interest.1 4 2
F. PublicPolicy

Courts, especially New York courts, attempt to prevent the United States

135. See PROWDA, supra note 2, at 183.
136. See Sheps, supra note 29 ("Unfortunately the lack of transparency in art
transactions further complicates due diligence efforts, yet the expectation of
thoroughness by the prospective purchaser remains high"); see also Bibas, supra note
117, at 2458 ("For deterrence to work, sanctions must be predictable and certain.").
137. See Day, supra note 67, at 459 ("[M]ost markets participants should prefer
remedial laws and economic regulations over a suboptimal status quo.").
138. Id. at 484, 487.
139. See id. at 487.
140. See id.; see generally Dempster, supra note 10 ("[T]he private nature of
transactions and a focus on client confidentiality and discretion are at the heart of a
highly personalised [sic] service.").
141. Dempster, supra note 10; see also Bibas, supra note 117, at 2451-52 ("Buyers
often rely on a gallery's reputation without requesting any other evidence of title");
Day, supra note 67, at 488 (explaining that when buyers see themselves as future
sellers, rather than as adversaries, they have no incentive to demand increased
efficiency).
142. Dempster, supra note 10.
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art market from becoming a safe haven for stolen art traffickers,' 4 3 while
also attempting to protect the commercial integrity of the art market.1 4 4 In
attempting to resolve art theft issues, specifically stressing the need to
combat stolen art traffic,14 5 courts have made equity-based determinations,
which necessarily consider public interest and public policy.1 4 6 These
determinations often do go beyond merely making the individual whole,
specifically, in furtherance of the public interest involved.1 47
The idea of public policy becomes important in art theft decisions,
including Porter.14 8 As such, a state policy seeking to limit and reduce the
illicit art trade should influence determinations of whether auction houses
should, too, be held liable for facilitating the sale of stolen art and what
remedy is effective to make the good faith purchaser whole, further public
interest, and sufficiently deter state-condoned behavior. 149 By establishing
a standard of care and appropriate remedy, auction houses will be deterred
from certain bad art market practices, and they will be encouraged to
perform thorough title investigations before agreeing to consign a work of
art. 150

More generally, as articulated in Porter, society values the ability to trust
that when individuals buy goods from established merchants, who present
themselves as knowledgeable in their trade, there is in fact an honest
exchange.1 5
Specifically, both the U.C.C. and state laws "seek to
encourage buyers to purchase commodities that are free of titling issues,"
and, as stated in Porter, the laws seek to protect good faith purchasers from
liability when they buy goods from reputable dealers.1 52 Society values the
ability to purchase goods with good title from established merchants, and
the law recognizes and reflects this societal value. Within the stolen art
context, public policy, as articulated by the Porter court, can be an
important factor when deciding which standard of care and remedy is most
effective to discourage bad art market practices.
143. Phelan, supra note 60, at 665.
144. Id. at 666.
145. Id. at 665-66
146. Id. at 665.
147. Id. at 666 (suggesting that the remedy may be molded depending upon the
public interest at stake).
148. Id. (reiterating the court's declaration that "commercial indifference to
ownership or the right to sell facilitates in the traffic in stolen works of art").
149. See McCord, supra note 9, at 1007.
150. Id.
151. See generally Dempster, supra note 10 ("There is widespread belief that trust,
in all its forms, is at the heart of the art world. Individuals rely on trust-based
relationships for transactions where handshake deals are the norm.").
152. Day, supra note 67, at 485.
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IV. AUCTION HOUSES AND ART DEALERS: DEVELOPING A UNIFIED
STANDARD OF CARE IN THE CASE OF STOLEN ART

Although auction houses often settle stolen art claims when they have no
current legal obligation to do so, especially after these events have become
publicized and there is a heightened risk of reputational harm,s3 voluntary
settlements have proved to be insufficient in combating the illicit art trade.
Bad faith and instances of less than due diligence suggest that new market
liabilities and general art trade regulation must be established. Auction
houses should be held strictly liable when they are merely or blatantly
indifferent to a stolen work of art's provenance and that work is sold
through auction. Furthermore, as proposed in Menzel and Porter, the good
faith purchaser should be made whole with compensatory damages
allowing him to recover the benefit of his bargain. It is important to note
that this solution is not in place of the already established court and
legislative rules, although this analysis certainly suggests that current legal
liabilities-which tilt strongly in favor of art theft victims over good faith
purchasers-should change to accommodate art market realities.
This recommendation not only takes in to account the realities and
limitations of the current and complex art market, but it also logically
extends the economic reasoning and framework appropriated in the Menzel
and Porter decisions to auction houses.
A good faith purchaser's
reasonable and socially accepted reliance on established merchants-as
well as powerful art market institutions including auction houses-jointly
with the purchaser's valid belief that he acquires good title from one who
regularly deals in the art trade should be preserved and continued to be
justified.1 5 4
The proposed solution would hold auction houses accountable only in
instances where their actions perpetuate and encourage the illegitimate art
market. Therefore, this recommendation will not heavily burden or cripple
the legitimate art business because it creates liability only in instances of
auction house bad faith. Examples of bad faith include, but are in no
means limited to, when auction houses sell works with suspiciously weak
provenances, like the Khmer antiquities; instances where a house sells a
work by blatantly misrepresenting aspects of the work's provenance, such
as the Hebrew manuscripts in Abrams; and instances where houses had
reason to know that the work was in fact stolen, including the Schloss
family's Hals painting.

153. See generally Dempster, supra note 10 ("International institutions such as

Sotheby's and Christie's build their brands on the strength of the reputations of their
experts and the personal relationships they forge with long-standing clients.").
154. Hoover, supra note 44, at 445.
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Although the proposed solution would not eradicate the illicit art trade
altogether, it would make the art market a bit more transparent and would
prevent auction houses from maintaining their traditional air of secrecy.
Purchasers and art theft victims have legitimate reservations about pursuing
claims. More specifically, good faith purchasers are not effectively
incentivized to protest bad auction house practices. Instead, buyers often
prefer to settle quietly for a much smaller sum than they deserve. By
devising a strict liability standard, a good faith purchaser is adequately
incentivized to raise a claim. The buyer knows for certain that he will be
able to recover the benefit of his bargain-rather than the mere purchase
price of the artwork in question-and will importantly be able to more
quickly recover without heavy litigation costs.
Because auction houses would know that they face decisive liability
when they fail to adequately perform title investigations, houses would be
incentivized to devise new and more efficient provenance and due
diligence standards. This may include auction houses working more
closely with other art market stakeholders as well as stolen art recovery
organizations such as the Art Loss Register, the International Foundation
for Art Recovery, and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization ("UNESCO). These organizations have the resources and
capacity to play an integral role in designing and implementing a uniform
and digitized stolen art database. Such a registry would make it easier for
auction houses to cross-reference their works offered for sale with listed
stolen works of art. Furthermore, a registry would allow art theft victims to
more easily and efficiently put art market stakeholders on notice of their
stolen property, heightening a chance of eventual recovery. Lastly, a
uniform and accessible database would place prospective purchasers in a
new position of power; buyers, too, could perform their own title
investigations, therefore lessening their immediate dependency on cultural
institutions (including auction houses) for invaluable information.
CONCLUSION

Ultimately, it is in the best interest of art market stakeholders including
art theft victims, auction houses, art collectors and purchasers, art recovery
organizations, and concerned cultural institutions (namely UNESCO) to
change the art market landscape to diminish the profitability of the stolen
art trade. Furthermore, it is in their best interest to aim for a more uniform
standard in general, from conducting provenance research to performing
due diligence investigations. A small but meaningful solution to combat
the illicit art trade is to establish auction house standard of care and liability
when selling stolen works of art. As long as the art market remains largely
unregulated, the sale of stolen artworks will continue without substantial
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repercussions.
There is a great tension between treating art as cultural and personal
patrimony and treating art as a business and investment opportunity,
especially when that art flows through the market as a result of looting and
war. Although this tension will never fully resolve, simply because there
will always be a market for art, there are steps that can be taken to alleviate
several of the issues. Establishing auction house liability and standard of
care when facilitating the sale of stolen art is just one step towards
sensitizing auctions houses and lessening this tension.

